

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST MEETING

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday 14 August 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

(United Arab Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. D. TEHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. Z. SEINER

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij MIKAEL IMRU

India:

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. S. LÖFGREN

Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN

Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. AHMED OSMAN

Mr. M.S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the 151st plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom delegation has noted with satisfaction the decision taken by the Committee on Monday last to adopt our Co-Chairmen's recommendation that today we should renew our discussion of item 5(d) of our agenda (ENDC/52) on the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I say that we have noted it with satisfaction because although the Committee has, of course, devoted time and attention at previous sessions to measures of nuclear disarmament, none of us can honestly claim that our discussions on this vital question have in any way been exhausted. It is clear that we shall need a great deal more discussion before the present gap between the positions of East and West on this question is likely to be bridged, and before mutually acceptable agreements are likely to be reached.

In the view of the United Kingdom delegation little or no progress is likely to be made until the Committee has first examined, in far more detail and in much greater depth than hitherto, the important technical issues involved in almost all measures of nuclear disarmament, whether they are proposed by the East or by the West. So in our view it is high time that we should get down to serious, detailed and, I hope, non-controversial examination of those measures. For those reasons, therefore, we welcome renewed discussion on item 5(d).

The discussions which we have so far had in this Committee on nuclear disarmament have already revealed some complicated technical problems which, whether we like it or not, we shall have to take into account. However difficult those technical problems may be the fact remains that one of the basic tasks of the Conference is to try to work out, and ultimately to agree on, a sound, realistic and practical solution. I do not pretend that that will be a quick or an easy task and I realize that some representatives may feel that general and complete disarmament, and total nuclear disarmament in particular, is so distant a goal that we would do better to concentrate on other issues which seem to offer some hope of early agreement; but I urge the Committee not to overlook the fact that we have here a forum which is perfectly capable of playing a dual role. We can, and we obviously must, search out those areas where there may be some prospect of reaching agreement in due course on collateral measures in advance of general and complete disarmament itself.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

However, that does not relieve us of our responsibility for trying to achieve a treaty on general and complete disarmament. If the goal of general and complete disarmament and total nuclear disarmament seems distant --- certainly none of us believes that it is just round the corner --- it certainly will not come any closer if we merely stare at it mesmerized, as it were, like rabbits by a powerful light during the hours of darkness.

We must carry on with our negotiations on general and complete disarmament with the same amount of vigour as we bring to our discussions on collateral measures. We now have, I believe, a unique opportunity to take advantage of the improved atmosphere in which, I am glad to say, our discussions are now taking place. That should help us to redouble our efforts in the field of general and complete disarmament, and I hope that this will apply to our work on nuclear disarmament as much as it does to our work on any other aspect of disarmament.

I think it is useful sometimes to remind ourselves that we are at least all agreed in principle on our basic objective so far as nuclear disarmament is concerned. Let me give a composite quotation from the joint statement of agreed principles:

"3. ... the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for: ...

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear ... weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons," (ENDC/5, p.2)

That, then, is our common and agreed objective. In other words, it is quite clear that our objective is total nuclear disarmament by all States. The reference to "the military establishment of every nation" would otherwise be meaningless. I think it is also correct to say that what the joint statement of agreed principles contemplates is total nuclear disarmament by all States by the end of stage III. It does not say that total nuclear disarmament must be carried out by the end of stage I or by the end of stage II. Indeed, if we remind ourselves of other paragraphs of the joint statement --- and I refer here particularly to paragraph 4 --- it is clear that we are all agreed that total nuclear disarmament should be carried out in much the same way as other disarmament measures, namely, "in an agreed sequence" and "by stages until it is completed" (ibid.). There is nothing sacrosanct about any given stage; what matters is the end product when the disarmament process is completed.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

However, in our discussions on item 5(d) we are concerned with means, not ends — and, of course, with particular reference to stage I.

Previous discussion has shown that opinions differ widely on what measures should be included in any given stage. I am not in the least disposed to question this morning the honesty and sincerity with which opinions are held in any quarter of this Committee. But the honesty and sincerity with which opinions are held is one thing; their validity is another. I therefore suggest that what is required is to consider whether opinions are in fact valid and, in particular, whether nuclear disarmament proposals — in whatever quarter they are propounded — pay due regard to technical realities.

I have made those remarks because the differences between the present positions of East and West — and they are differences mainly over method and timing — will probably never be resolved without a dispassionate analysis of those technical realities. As I see it, our first task should be to try to establish some common ground in this field. Once we are agreed in the basic technical facts, as Mr. Godber said at the meeting on 29 May:

"... we could then move forward and consider what nuclear disarmament measures it would be appropriate to include in each stage of our treaty on general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.138, p.41)

At the same meeting, Mr. Godber went on to remind the Committee that:

"... such measures will have to be related very closely to a realistic assessment of what is technically feasible from the point of view of verification." (ibid.)

That still seems to us in the United Kingdom delegation the most sensible way to proceed. We hope that other delegations agree with us. We hope that, to take an immediate example, we may now receive more substantial comments than have hitherto been vouchsafed on the United Kingdom paper entitled "The Technical Possibility of International Control of Fissile Material Production" (ENDC/60). Since that paper was specifically prepared for the Committee's consideration, and since it was circulated as a Conference document almost a year ago, I hope that no one will accuse me of being unduly controversial if I say that the time has come when we really must consider the technical issues raised in it.

In that connexion, the Committee may perhaps recall that on 12 June the Soviet representative referred to what he called "the mythical danger of nuclear weapons

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secretly retained by a State or several States." (ENDC/PV.143, p.40). The Committee may recall also that Sir Michael Wright, on 7 September of last year (ENDC/PV.82, p.38 et seq.), Mr. Godber more recently on 29 May (ENDC/PV.138, p.38 et seq.) and I myself on 12 June (ENDC/PV.143, p.32 et seq.), all explained in some detail the reasons why we in the West do not consider that such a danger is, to use Mr. Tsarapkin's word, "mythical". For the reasons given in the United Kingdom working paper to which I have just referred (ENDC/60), such a danger seems to us to be only too real. So here we have a clear difference of opinion. It is therefore only fair to ask our Soviet colleague to come forward with the reasons why he thinks we are wrong in this matter.

We also look forward to statements not only from representatives who have already spoken on this item on our agenda but also from representatives who have not yet done so. In particular, we hope to have the benefit of statements from those of our colleagues who represent countries, whether aligned or non-aligned, which have had some experience of nuclear matters and which can I am sure make a useful contribution to our work in this field.

To sum up, may I suggest that we might profitably consider first of all whether the technical analysis and conclusions of the United Kingdom working paper (ENDC/60) could be broadly applied to other fissile material producing countries. The details of that paper are well known to the Committee and I need not therefore repeat them this morning. But, as Mr. Godber suggested at the meeting of the Committee on 29 May:

"... it would be most helpful to learn the considered technical and scientific views of both the United States and the Soviet Union in this matter."

(ENDC/PV.138, p.40)

My United States colleague has already pointed out at various times that there are serious technical issues surrounding the problem of verifying the reduction and final elimination of nuclear warheads. That is why he has suggested on at least two occasions, and with the full support of the United Kingdom delegation, that the examination of those unresolved questions which is contemplated in stage I of the United States draft treaty outline (ENDC/30) need not necessarily await the signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament but could begin as soon as delegations felt themselves prepared to undertake the necessary studies.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I think the time has now come when the Committee should consider whether or not to take up that offer. I hope that the Soviet representative, for one, is now able or will soon be able to convey to the Committee a positive response from his Government to that offer. If so, perhaps such an examination could start after we have concluded a general exchange of views in plenary session and have moved on to other items of our disarmament agenda. The exact timing of such an examination and the composition of the forum in which it might take place are clearly matters which the Committee may wish to consider. The United Kingdom delegation will be prepared to offer constructive suggestions at the appropriate moment; but there might be advantage, for example, in conducting this study in a smaller forum than our plenary meetings. But the point I want to stress is that we really must get on with a serious examination of the technical problems involved in practically all measures of nuclear disarmament. I think it is fairly clear that there will not be much time for this during our current session. But I am convinced that if the Committee agreed that an examination of these issues on the lines suggested by the United States representative should start before, say, the end of this year, that would be a most useful step forward.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): In the course of our previous discussions of the subject we are considering today -- nuclear disarmament measures in stage I -- my delegation has had the opportunity to state and to elaborate on in some detail the basic approach of the United States to this most important and complex problem, and to describe the specific measures which, in the view of the United States, would be feasible at the initial stage of disarmament and which would start us on our way to the ultimate goal we have set for ourselves.

Representatives will recall that the United States treaty outline (ENDC/30) contains four major measures relating to nuclear disarmament in stage I. First, the ~~race~~ in nuclear weapons production would be halted through a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons. Second, reduction in nuclear stockpiles would be initiated through transfer of significant quantities of weapons grade U-235 to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Third, States would undertake obligations with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Fourth, nuclear weapons technology would be frozen with a comprehensive test ban which we hope would be agreed upon and put into effect perhaps even before stage I of a general and complete disarmament programme was initiated, as a further step to the

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

limited test ban agreement (ENDC/100/Rev.1) which was signed in Moscow last week and which has been welcomed by an overwhelming majority of States throughout the world.

Representatives will also recall that the Soviet delegation has expressed a negative attitude towards these United States proposals, its basic objection being that these measures would not eliminate nuclear weapons and thus not relieve humanity of the threat of nuclear war. My delegation does not wish at this time to dwell upon the various charges the Soviet delegation has been advancing concerning the true intention of the United States with regard to nuclear disarmament. We believe the record is clear. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have subscribed to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiation which provides that the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions with respect to the military establishments of every nation for

"Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons". (ENDC/5, p.2)

Thus, the real problem before us is how to achieve that goal, and we do not believe that our search for mutually acceptable and practicable ways of accomplishing that task is furthered by repetitious questioning of the sincerity of this or that party.

What my delegation would like to do today is to call attention to our views on how we can tackle the problem of beginning nuclear disarmament in stage I, and also to indicate certain possibilities which we sincerely hope could help us in due course to bridge the gap between the approaches advocated respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union.

My delegation believes that the wise and practical approach both sides have displayed in agreeing on a limited test ban treaty should serve us as useful guidance in our efforts to resolve other difficult and important problems inherent in any arms control or disarmament process. That approach is very simple: basically it means that we should seek agreement on such measures as are feasible and are in the interest of all parties concerned, without postponing such agreement for the sake of broader and more far-reaching arrangements requiring more extensive study and negotiations.

The step proposed by the United States to halt further production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes in stage I would obviously not eliminate all nuclear weapons, and it could perhaps allow production of some additional nuclear weapons from the stockpiles of weapons grade fissionable material already accumulated.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

However, it would place a ceiling on the nuclear weapons capability of nations already possessing such capability and would assist in halting proliferation of additional national capabilities. Since the stated policies of both the United States and the Soviet Union favour halting the nuclear arms race and oppose proliferation of nuclear weapons a measure of this kind should, it seems to us, be in the mutual interest of both sides, and given good will on both sides we believe we could develop the necessary verification arrangements which would give adequate assurance of compliance without being too onerous to any party.

But the United States proposals go even further. For, in addition to and in association with placing a ceiling on the nuclear weapons capabilities of nuclear Powers, they provide also for a cut-back in those capabilities by means of transfer of significant quantities of weapons grade U-235 already produced to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. For the reasons just indicated, my delegation believes that such transfer would also be in the interest of both sides. Furthermore this measure, while being a measure of real or at least preventive disarmament, would be simple to implement and to verify. Its verification would involve only verification of the quantity and quality and assurances against possible diversion to weapons uses of the materials transferred. It circumvents one of the major difficulties inherent in nuclear disarmament, namely, revelation of closely guarded State secrets concerning nuclear weapons design.

The United States treaty outline (ENDC/30) tabled on 18 April 1962 provides that the United States and the Soviet Union would each transfer to non-weapons uses 50,000 kgs of weapons grade U-235. At the same time, in our statements we have repeatedly indicated that if that amount is for some reason unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union we should be prepared to consider, within reason, appropriate adjustments. In its effort to find a mutually acceptable arrangement in this field, the United States delegation approached the Soviet delegation in April of this year and indicated that if the Soviet Union's objection to the United States proposal was based on a feeling that the amount proposed by the United States was not sufficiently large to have a tangible effect on the nuclear capabilities of the parties concerned, the United States would be prepared to consider, within reason, an amount larger than 50,000 kgs. In addition, my delegation stated that if the Soviet Union felt that transfer of equal amounts by both the United States and the USSR would for some reason entail certain inequities for the Soviet Union, the United States would be prepared

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

to consider an arrangement providing for a ratio of transfer calling for transfer by the United States, after a cut-off of production, of an amount larger, again within reason, than the amount to be transferred by the USSR. My delegation told the Soviet delegation that transfer by the United States of 60,000 kgs and by the USSR of 40,000 kgs would be an example of such an arrangement. We indicated also to the Soviet delegation that the United States was still prepared to explore the possibility of an arrangement under which the cut-off and the transfer, as a combined step, would not need necessarily to await agreement on, or the initiation of, the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

Unfortunately, the reaction of the Soviet delegation to that approach has been negative. However, we have not abandoned the hope that after further study the Soviet Union will find our proposals worthy of serious examination and negotiations so that we may reach agreement on what in our view would be another step in the direction both sides desire. In the meantime we could also undertake the studies necessary for the development of further, more far-reaching measures of nuclear disarmament to follow later in the process, to which the representative of the United Kingdom has referred this morning.

To reflect the United States willingness to accept, in association with the cut-off of production, a reasonable arrangement providing for the transfer of fissionable materials on a ratio basis, my delegation would like to request the Secretariat to circulate an amendment to Section C, Stage I, of the United States Treaty Outline (ENDC/30). The amendment concerns sub-paragraph a, paragraph 2, Section C, which should now read as follows:

"a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons agreed quantities of weapons grade U-235 from past production. The United States of America would transfer _____ kilograms, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would transfer _____ kilograms of such weapons grade U-235. For this purpose, 'weapons grade U-235' means the U-235 contained in metal of which at least 90 per cent of the weight is U-235." 1/

1/ Circulated as document ENDC/30/Add.3.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Since, under the procedural arrangements adopted by the Committee at our plenary meeting on 12 August (ENDC/PV.150) we are now approaching the end of the present phase of our plenary discussions of stage I nuclear measures, my delegation would also like to request the Secretariat to circulate as a conference document^{1/} draft treaty language covering the various nuclear disarmament measures proposed by the United States for Stage I, as they have been described in the course of our plenary meetings. At an appropriate time, our suggested treaty language could be referred, in accordance with past practice, to the co-Chairmen for further consideration.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): As a number of speakers reminded us at our last meeting, the primary task of this Conference is to work out a programme of general and complete disarmament. The opening words of the preamble to the Moscow test ban treaty tell us that the three nuclear Powers have as their principal aim:

"... the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations, which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons". (ENDC/100/Rev.1)

I should like to emphasize the words "speediest possible achievement". They mean, it seems to the Canadian delegation, that all of us here should do what we can to find ways in which the Conference can do something effective to help reach that goal, and as speedily as possible.

We have not a long time in which to work before the General Assembly, and I think all of us would want to put it to good use. I understand that already more than half the members of the United Nations have signed the Moscow test ban treaty. Now they will be saying to this Conference -- addressing themselves especially to the representatives of the great Powers -- "The test ban is very good, but what next? What is your next move towards the goal of total disarmament to which we have all pledged ourselves by resolution of this Assembly?"

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/109

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Shortly after this Conference convened in March 1962 the Canadian delegation prepared an outline comparison of the disarmament proposals of the United States and those of the Soviet Union. We submitted document ENDC/36 of 4 May 1962 which contained in two parallel columns a description of the main proposals of each side under various subject headings during the three stages of the disarmament plans.

Some people outside this Conference, who are not familiar with its work, may believe that since we began our sessions little progress has been made towards achieving general and complete disarmament. If one measures our work by concrete results -- by rockets or tanks destroyed, or soldiers demobilized, as we said on a former occasion -- that view is correct: we have not achieved concrete results. But such a view would overlook the considerable progress that has been made in drawing together the ideas of the two sides on how general and complete disarmament is to be accomplished. In all great projects we have to decide how we are going to do a thing before we start doing it -- and the deciding is usually the hardest part of the operation. The view that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference has accomplished little or nothing does not take into account the difficulty of the problem we face, nor the degree of rapprochement of positions which has taken place.

Early this year the Canadian delegation outlined a number of areas in the disarmament field where the proposals of the two sides had tended to come closer together; and, since then, further changes have been made. The Canadian delegation has therefore decided to submit a new outline comparison^{1/} including the new proposals submitted by both sides. I believe that even a brief comparison of this revised table with that submitted by us on 4 May 1962 (ENDC/36) will show the many changes which have occurred in the positions of the two sides since the original document was submitted. For example, Section A of our revised paper, on the subject of armaments, shows changes in the United States position which were introduced by amendments to its disarmament plan, and in draft Article 5 submitted by the United States delegation in document ENDC/69 of 10 December 1962. Changes are also shown in the Soviet column to reflect the Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127, pp.38-40) for the retention of a strictly limited number of missiles in certain categories until the end of Stage II. In Section B of our revised paper, relating to armed forces, changes are shown in the proposals of the Soviet Union reflecting

1/ Circulated as document ENDC/36/Rev.1.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

amendments submitted last summer. In Section C, on nuclear weapons, and Section F, on the reduction of the risk of war, there are additional references to subsequent Soviet proposals, and Section I, on transition, reflects United States amendments of last summer.

I cite these changes as examples of the fact that there has been a steady forward movement on the part of both sides towards closing the gap which exists between their proposals in various important areas.

I might add that the paper to which I have referred -- document ENDC/36 -- should not be confused with another document, ENDC/79, which we introduced on 3 April 1963, outlining some significant developments in the United States and Soviet Union disarmament plans between 1960 and 1963. That particular table is not a comprehensive outline of the positions of the two sides but, rather, just refers to the development and the bringing together of their respective positions since the year 1960. We hope to issue shortly an addendum to the second document (ENDC/79) in order to take account of some of the new proposals or modifications to which I have referred and which have been made since document ENDC/79 was issued.

The Canadian delegation is tabling the present outline comparisons -- the revision of document ENDC/36 -- in the hope that it will facilitate our task as we proceed in our disarmament discussions and consider the various items on our agenda. In the Canadian delegation's view our task, during the three weeks or so that we can continue to meet here for this session, should be to move ahead to discuss as many as possible of the remaining items concerning stage I of general and complete disarmament, which are set forth in the agenda (ENDC/52) prepared by the co-Chairmen. Naturally, we do not expect to reach agreement on any particular item on the list. This, we think, will be more in the nature of an exploratory session. But if we are to be successful explorers we have to press on with vigour, and not wait and hope that the discoveries will come to us. If we engaged in this exploration with sufficient energy and seriousness we could probably add to the number of areas of progress of the kind which I have mentioned, and which are shown in the document we intend to submit.

As for the subject of item 5(d) -- nuclear disarmament, or the reduction of nuclear weapons in stage I, which is the subject scheduled principally for discussion today -- the Canadian delegation expressed its viewpoint in its statement on 19 June 1963 (ENDC/PV.146, pp. 5 et seq.), and for the present we have nothing to add

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

to that, except that we welcome very heartily the proposal which has been put on record by the United States representative this morning with regard to the new conditions for the reduction of fissile material of weapons grade in the first stage, or before it, and we hope that there will be a constructive response to this proposal from the representative of the Soviet Union. We have also noted the points made in the speech by the representative of the United Kingdom. As a nation with some experience in the development of atomic energy and atomic science generally, we have been examining the proposals which were put forward in the United Kingdom paper (ENDC/6C), and we shall perhaps have some comments to make on them at a future meeting.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): My delegation has not yet taken part in the discussion on item 5(d) of our agenda, (ENDC/52) and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to do so very briefly today by noting first of all that this discussion, which will soon be closed, is ending in a new and particularly favourable atmosphere since it follows the conclusion of the treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests. (ENDC/100/Rev.1) As you know, a total nuclear test ban is precisely one of the measures provided for in the first stage of the Western plan. It is therefore very satisfactory to be able to note that at least a part of the measures envisaged in item 5(d) have already been accepted even before the discussion of that item had been completed in our Committee. As we have all emphasized, that constitutes a most important step forward which encourages us to pursue our task to the end.

Another matter I should like to mention today is the submission this morning of certain United States documents referring to item 5(d). They are, I believe, very important and extremely interesting texts. We are aware, of course, that those proposals differ from the proposals on the first stage made by the Soviet delegation. Nevertheless, we feel sure that the Soviet delegation will again study them on the basis of the document submitted and in the spirit which has so happily prevailed among us since the signing of the Moscow Agreement, that is to say, in a constructive spirit, a spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation which will, we hope, lead us towards positive results. This is all the more necessary because the item we have on our agenda today deals with a problem of quite fundamental importance, that

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

of the most murderous weapons which man has ever invented and which unfortunately still hold over the world the threat of disaster on an unprecedented scale.

In view of the dangers of nuclear weapons, what should really be done is perhaps to eradicate completely from the human mind the very knowledge of those terrible secrets which have made the manufacture of these arms possible. But at the present time it is only by general and complete disarmament in all sectors guaranteed by appropriate systems that we can succeed in saving mankind from the tragic applications of these scientific discoveries. Unfortunately, so long as the possibility of war exists, even if it is a conventional war, the danger of a nuclear holocaust cannot be ruled out, for a conventional conflict can always degenerate into a nuclear one. Thus conventional disarmament and nuclear disarmament are necessarily connected and interdependent in a complete and unified disarmament plan, and they must go forward simultaneously and pari passu. However, we must examine both problems systematically, and it is on the nuclear problem that, in accordance with our agenda, my delegation wishes to focus its attention today.

We know that the problem of nuclear disarmament is not only the most important, but also the most difficult problem to solve. It would have been relatively easy at the outset to place the atomic bomb under control when the Baruch Plan was first put forward and unfortunately rejected. Now, because of the development and improvement of modern technology and the mass-manufacture of weapons, that control has become extremely difficult. "If we want to achieve results, we must consider the problem from a very realistic aspect and recognize the existing difficulties, the obstacles of a technical nature and the need for a gradual approach. By acting otherwise we should risk embarking on absolutely sterile or illusory work. It seems that, in order to succeed, we must strike at the root of the evil and start by applying in the first stage relatively easy measures capable of arresting the nuclear arms race while bringing about an initial improvement in the present situation. Later, during the following stages, we shall be able, by taking advantage of the mutual trust which the application of those first measures will have created, as well as of jointly conducted technical studies, to proceed still further and to eliminate completely and forever the danger of atomic bombs. The first steps to be taken are obviously, in my opinion, to prohibit the use of fissionable material for military purposes, to stop the further perfecting of atomic bombs by banning new tests, and to prevent States not yet in possession of the atomic bomb from obtaining the latter by some means or other.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Those are the three main lines along which, in my opinion, we should work. The recently concluded treaty in Moscow on the banning of nuclear tests shows that work along those lines would be useful, and that our hopes in this respect are certainly well founded.

If we could come to an agreement on all those measures, the nuclear danger could be kept in check and a new situation would arise enabling us to consider the future of disarmament with complete confidence. If it is desired to eliminate a product from the market, the first step is of course to prohibit its manufacture. Hence, the first decision we must take is to prohibit the use of fissile materials produced in the factories of the various countries for the manufacture of atomic or thermonuclear bombs. That is a relatively easy measure, for it does not involve the application of very extensive investigations which might be embarrassing for the countries subject to control, and all possibilities of espionage or other dangers of the kind could easily be eliminated.

Of course, the objection generally made to these proposals is that the stockpiles of bombs existing on both sides already constitute a potential of immense destructive power regardless of the future course of production or the future military use of fissile materials.

We do not deny the importance of the existing stockpiles, and of course we ask nothing better than that they should all be destroyed immediately, but we also realize the insurmountable difficulties that would face us should we attempt this gigantic task.

Furthermore, it is certainly not true that prohibition of the use of new fissile materials for the manufacture of new bombs would only be a measure of little importance or limited scope. It is quite the contrary. First, the "cut-off" is the preliminary condition without which all other nuclear disarmament agreements would obviously be useless. It is therefore a necessary and inevitable measure which should be applied at the beginning of any plan for nuclear disarmament so as to render the other measures possible and effective.

Secondly, if the nuclear arsenal is already highly developed, there is no reason to suppose that, in the absence of an undertaking to the contrary, it will not be increased still further by new production.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Thirdly, if a cut-off agreement is concluded, the whole of the future production of fissile materials will become available for peaceful purposes, and this will be to the undoubted advantage not only of the producer countries but also of all the other countries which will easily be able to obtain from the major producers the fissionable material they need for industrial, scientific and other peaceful purposes.

Lastly, we must not overlook the psychological effect of a cut-off agreement. Any agreement on disarmament, even a partial one, immediately has a favourable repercussion on the negotiations as a whole and on the international climate in general. We have just had a proof of this in these last few days, after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. It can easily be imagined that a nuclear cut-off agreement, coming after an agreement on the tests, would have still greater and more favourable repercussions on international public opinion and on the relations between governments.

The cut-off is a "freezing" measure which arrests the progress and development of an extremely dangerous armaments race, while creating a much better atmosphere and eliminating tension, but it falls short of reversing the armaments spiral in the field of atomic and thermonuclear bombs. Hence it is necessary to go further, and other appropriate measures have already been envisaged as a first stage in the Western plan. Once all production of fissile materials for military purposes has been stopped, the proposal envisages also a gradual reduction of existing fissile material for military purposes, and this represents decisive progress towards the complete solution of the problem by the application of a realistic, controllable and gradual system.

It is obvious that the greater the quantity of fissile materials transferred from military to peaceful purposes, the more the rate of disarmament will be accelerated. In this connexion the United States proposal is of great value, not only because of the quantity to be transferred, which corresponds to the explosive charges of some hundreds of rockets, but also because of its flexible character. This proposal is open to counter-proposals of even larger scope, and I believe that after the first step has been taken we could advance farther and faster in the matter of the reconversion of fissile materials.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

It may be objected that the stockpiles of fissile materials and bombs are so enormous that even quite large transfers of fissile materials would have only a limited effect. I would remark in this connexion that every transfer, every measure which might improve the present situation, will always be of great value both from the technical and the psychological point of view. Moreover, the conversion to peaceful purposes of certain quantities of existing fissile materials would immediately place at the disposal of human progress important means which had hitherto been prepared for its destruction. That in itself would be of considerable importance technically and of very great significance psychologically.

To sum up, if all the measures provided for in the first stage in the Western plan -- the cut-off, reconversion of fissile materials, non-proliferation, prohibition of all tests -- were implemented, we should achieve global results of inestimable value, and an atmosphere of trust would be created which would enable us to pass on easily to the second and third disarmament stages. Meanwhile it would be easy to undertake, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, the necessary studies for finding the means and controls necessary for the final, complete, concerted and verified destruction of all the remaining bombs. This, obviously, should always be our main objective.

Thus, we should eliminate gradually but completely and in a constructive spirit the difficulties which attend nuclear disarmament, and with the help of the further measures envisaged in our disarmament plan for the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and of conventional arms, we could embark on a constructive course and could start on the second stage of disarmament with a solid basis for carrying out the more radical but technically more difficult and delicate measures which we all desire and which represent the final goal of our efforts.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The signing in Moscow on 5 August of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1) is an important event of our time. It marks the solution of an important international problem and is a significant step towards the improvement of the international situation, opening up favourable opportunities for the solution of other international problems. The conclusion of the test ban treaty shows that, given good will, States with different social systems can and do find mutually

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acceptable solutions to important and urgent international problems. This inspires the hope that outstanding international problems, with which the ensuring of international security and the strengthening of world peace are linked, can be settled by peaceful means through negotiation.

The Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and the great majority of other countries have noted that the agreement achieved in Moscow is only a beginning and that very much more will have to be done to ensure peace on earth.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, said the following in this connexion:

"It would, of course, be wrong to labour under any delusions regarding the successes achieved and to relax our energies and determination in the further struggle for the solution of questions on which depends the consolidation of peace on earth. We must realize quite clearly that the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests does not yet mean the cessation of the arms race and, consequently, cannot in itself avert the danger of war. Nor does this measure liquidate the burden of armaments, on the production of which States are spending vast material resources.

"The main task consists precisely in putting an end to the arms race, in disarmament. Only along this path can we really secure the elimination of the threat of war and relieve States of the burden of military expenditures." (ENDC/103, p.2)

As can be seen from numerous comments on the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, the overwhelming majority of statesmen fully share that view. All recognize that the task before us is to consolidate the success achieved in Moscow and, by taking further decisive steps, to lay the basis for the complete elimination of the danger of a nuclear missile war. In view of radical changes in military techniques in recent years and the unprecedented increase in the destructive power of modern means of warfare, the problem of eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war has become particularly urgent.

At previous sessions of the Committee, convincing data were adduced to show the immense destructive and devastating power of the accumulated stocks of nuclear weapons. Eminent scientists, political leaders and military specialists throughout the world have often pointed out that at the present time such vast

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quantities of these weapons of mass destruction have already been accumulated in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers that, if all these stocks were used, the whole surface of the globe would be scorched, fused and reduced to ashes eight or even ten times over. In those circumstances, a certain reduction of the rate of nuclear production or the freezing of the present volume of production of nuclear weapons, as proposed by the United States for stage I of disarmament, would achieve nothing from the standpoint of eliminating or at least reducing the threat of a devastating nuclear missile war. Indeed, in this respect, for the achievement of this aim what would be the good of ceasing the production of fissionable materials or reducing by a few dozen tons these materials for the manufacture of nuclear bombs, if tens of thousands of atomic and hydrogen bombs have already been stockpiled in the depots of the nuclear Powers? No, it is not in that direction that we should look for the solution of the problem. Everyone realizes that the threat of a nuclear war will hang over mankind until all these bombs are destroyed, that is to say, this problem can only be solved through real nuclear disarmament.

An analysis of the measures for nuclear disarmament proposed by the Western Powers shows that they not only do not ensure the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, but do not even help to any extent to reduce that threat. Indeed, can we believe that the cessation of production of fissionable materials would reduce the nuclear threat? At the present time, when the depots of the nuclear Powers contain many thousands of nuclear bombs, which can be used at any moment to strike a blow at the other side, when these depots are constantly being replenished with more and more batches of nuclear weapons of various kinds, produced from the very large quantity of fissionable materials already accumulated, would the United States proposal for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes lead to the destruction or even to the reduction of the already existing vast stocks of nuclear weapons? No, it would not.

Under the United States proposal, out of the total stock of the tens of thousands of nuclear bombs existing at the present time not a single bomb would be destroyed, and even the production of new bombs from the already accumulated stocks of fissionable materials would not cease. Nevertheless, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, emphasized at our meeting of 29 May of the Committee that:

"10 per cent of the present stocks of fission and fusion weapons are more than enough to obliterate the major cities of the world ..."

(ENDC/PV.138, p.43)

I emphasize: all the major cities of the world.

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In that case what would be the good of implementing such a measure as ceasing the production of fissionable materials for military purposes? The implementation of that measure would be of no importance for the elimination or even for the reduction of the threat of a nuclear missile war. It is obvious to everyone that that measure would not be a step in regard to disarmament, nor would it be a measure which would be in accordance with the task of disarmament for stage I, because, as a result of its implementation, not only would nuclear weapons not be destroyed but there would even be no reduction of the existing immense stockpiles of these weapons. But if the implementation of the United States proposal for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes would not lead, as is obvious to everyone, to any positive changes in regard to eliminating or at least reducing the threat of a nuclear war, on the other hand, the implementation of that United States proposal would be fraught with certain negative and even harmful consequences for the security of States.

It must not be forgotten that the implementation of that measure would lead to the establishment of control over existing production of nuclear materials without any disarmament. Particular stress was laid on that aspect of the matter, on the establishment of control, also in the statements made today by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. But everyone knows perfectly well that the Soviet Union cannot agree to the establishment of control without any disarmament measures. The establishment of control without disarmament would not contribute towards the improvement of the international situation and the creation of confidence. On the contrary, it would lead to increased suspicion and would merely aggravate the relations between States. To sum up, such a course of action would be fraught with far-reaching negative consequences.

What would be achieved by the other United States-United Kingdom proposal in the field of nuclear disarmament -- their proposal for the transfer of a certain proportion of the stocks of U-235 to peaceful uses, that is to say, that the Soviet Union and the United States should each transfer 50 tons of U-235 to peaceful uses? As we have already pointed out, this measure likewise has no relation to nuclear disarmament or to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war.

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At the last session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, reference was made to data which showed that the United States, for example, already had a stock of 300 to 350 tons of U-235 two years ago. Besides their stocks of U-235, the nuclear Powers also have substantial reserves of plutonium. In the present circumstances, when a vast quantity of fissionable materials has been accumulated in the world, what could be the significance of such a measure as the transfer by the Soviet Union and the United States of 50 tons each of U-235 to peaceful uses? This measure would mean that only one-tenth or even less of the existing stocks of fissionable materials would be transferred to peaceful uses, whereas the remaining nine-tenths or perhaps even fourteen-fifteenths of fissionable materials would still remain in the sphere of military production. In this connexion I should like to remind members of the Committee of the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the meeting of the Committee of 29 May to the effect that 5 per cent of the existing stocks of nuclear materials would be enough to make 1,000 bombs, considerably more powerful than those which were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. (ENDC/PV.138, p.43)

The representatives of the Western Powers assert that their proposal for the cessation of production of fissile materials would serve as a brake on the further intensification of the nuclear arms race. Thus, Mr. Stelle said that

"The cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapon uses, combined with the transfer of significant quantities of such materials to uses other than in weapons, would halt the spiralling nuclear arms race." (ENDC/PV.146, p.20)

Mr. Stelle made a similar statement today, (supra, p.11) and was supported in this by the representative of Italy. (supra, p.18) But all these assertions are very far from the truth. We have already shown clearly and convincingly that cessation of the production of fissionable materials would have no effect on the stocks of nuclear bombs already accumulated and consequently would not reduce the threat of nuclear war one whit. At the present time so large a quantity of fissionable materials has already been produced, that even if the further production of these materials is halted, the already accumulated stocks would be quite sufficient for the manufacture of many hundreds or even thousands of new nuclear warheads.

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All these considerations lead to the inevitable conclusion that the United States-United Kingdom proposal for cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the transfer by two nuclear Powers of 50 tons each of U-235 to peaceful uses in no way solves the problem of eliminating the threat of nuclear war, and therefore it cannot be taken as a basis for agreement on nuclear disarmament in stage I of general and complete disarmament.

The measures proposed by the Western Powers would merely create the dangerous delusion that measures were being taken in the field of nuclear disarmament, whereas in actual fact the nuclear threat would not only not be reduced during stage I, but would continue to grow and become more serious as the technique of the production of nuclear weapons from the accumulated stocks of nuclear materials developed and improved.

As regards the position of the Western Powers on the question of nuclear disarmament, we should like to note yet another very important aspect, namely, that we have not yet heard any definite and clear statement from the representatives of the Western Powers to the effect that the United States-United Kingdom programme provides for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the complete destruction of all stockpiles. On the contrary, during the last session of the Committee the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, made a statement in which he emphasized that:

"... we (the United States) do not prejudge or take a firm position on whether or not the international peace force should be equipped with nuclear weapons; nor do we take a firm position on the time when such weapons should be made available if they are."

(ENDC/PV.146, p.22)

From this and other statements by the United States representative it quite clearly follows that the Western Powers not only admit, but actually contemplate the possibility of equipping international armed forces with nuclear weapons. The statement of the United States representative that they are prepared to prohibit nuclear weapons and to eliminate stockpiles applies, as they declare, only to States, but not to international armed forces. This approach to the question of nuclear disarmament is absolutely unacceptable, because nuclear weapons, irrespective of whether they are used by States or by international armed forces, are still weapons of mass destruction, intended to raze cities and to destroy

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millions of people. The question whether these weapons would be used by so-called international armed forces or by the armed forces of any particular State does not alter the substance of the matter. In either case, nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction, and should be prohibited and completely destroyed in the process of disarmament without any exception whatsoever; the sooner that is done the better.

We therefore consider that nuclear weapons should be prohibited and that they should all be eliminated without exception, so that they should not be available either to governments or to any international organizations or international armed forces. If the Western Powers agree to such a solution of the problem of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, we should like to hear a clear statement from them to that effect. We hope that the representatives of the Western Powers, taking into account the situation that has come about, will draw the necessary conclusion and will reconsider their position on this question. We also hope that they will take a positive attitude towards the proposals of the Soviet Union, which provide for the elimination of the nuclear threat through the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I of general and complete disarmament.

The draft treaty on general and complete disarmament which the Soviet Union submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee in March 1962 (ENDC/2) has as its primary task the speediest elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war and lays down effective and feasible measures for the practical accomplishment of that task. The Soviet draft treaty provides for the destruction of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I of disarmament. Without the means of delivery it is impossible to use nuclear weapons. For this reason, even though nuclear weapons would still be retained in the depots of States until the end of stage II of disarmament, they would in fact remain immobilized. The threat of nuclear aggression would be practically eliminated.

After the Soviet Union had submitted its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and as a result of the discussion of the draft in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and in the General Assembly, the Soviet side proposed a number of substantial changes and additions to its original draft treaty. (ENDC/2/Add.1, Rev.1, Rev.1/Corr.1) This was done in order to meet the positions of the Western Powers

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and thus help forward the achievement of agreement on disarmament questions. These changes and additions to the original draft treaty are well known to the members of the Committee.

At this meeting we should merely like to point out that, in order to reach agreement on disarmament measures for stage I, especially on measures relating to the speediest elimination of the threat of nuclear war, the Soviet Union, in order to meet the views of the Western Powers, agreed to introduce into its original draft treaty a substantial change with regard to the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I. The Soviet side proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain until the end of stage II of disarmament a limited agreed number of certain types of missiles. To our regret, this Soviet proposal failed to meet with support on the part of the United States, without which, as we all know, the question concerned cannot be solved.

For the final elimination of the nuclear threat, it is essential to prohibit nuclear weapons for all time, to eliminate them from the armaments of States, to destroy all stockpiles of such weapons and to cease their production completely. That is precisely the series of measures which is proposed in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Article 22, paragraph 1(a), of the Soviet draft treaty reads as follows:

"Nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissionable materials extracted from such weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct reconstitution into weapons and shall form a special stock for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be completely destroyed." (ENDC/2/Rew.1, p.16)

The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provides for the complete cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of all materials necessary for their creation. The same article continues as follows:

"All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All

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workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes." (ibid.)

Thus the Soviet Union proposes to transfer to peaceful uses, from the sphere of destruction to the sphere of construction, not 50 tons each of U-235, as proposed by the United States, but the whole quantity of fissionable materials already produced and stockpiled. We propose that nuclear weapons should be outlawed and that any attempt to reconstitute them whether by individuals or by organizations should be made a crime. The Soviet Union regards it as inconceivable that nuclear weapons eliminated from the national arsenals of States could be retained under some kind of international label, at the disposal of an international armed force. When all stocks of nuclear weapons are destroyed and when general and complete disarmament is carried out, there will be no place for nuclear weapons on the earth.

Under the Soviet draft treaty, all measures for nuclear disarmament are to be carried out under strict international control. The relevant paragraph of article 22 of the Soviet draft reads as follows:

"The measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapon purposes referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

"The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to inspect all undertakings which extract raw materials for atomic production

"The States parties to the Treaty shall make available to the International Disarmament Organization documents pertaining to the extraction and processing of nuclear raw materials ..." (ibid., p.17)

The control measures provided for in the Soviet draft fully meet the requirements of the strictest and most effective control over the process of eliminating stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet delegation is convinced of the unquestionable advantages of its plan for nuclear disarmament over the Western plan, since the measures it proposes would indeed eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war. Nevertheless, it is still prepared to consider any amendments to its proposals and to accept them if such amendments help towards the speediest possible accomplishment of the task of eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

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That is precisely why the Soviet Union, bearing in mind the statements of the representatives of a number of non-aligned States in favour of the elimination of nuclear weapons in the earliest stages of disarmament, stated its willingness to agree to the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the elimination of all stockpiles in stage I. Just as a chain reaction of fissionable materials occurs only in certain quantitative conditions, when there is a critical mass, whereas when there is a smaller mass of fissile substance, in ordinary conditions, a chain reaction does not occur, so the threat of nuclear war can be eliminated only in very definite conditions, namely, if nuclear weapons are prohibited and completely destroyed.

At the last session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, we examined thoroughly the problem of nuclear disarmament within the framework of the general and complete disarmament of States. The main objections of the representatives of the Western Powers to the Soviet programme for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war in stage I were that this programme provided for an unduly radical solution of the problem.

The United States representative, Mr. Stelle, said that one of the shortcomings of the Soviet programme for nuclear disarmament was that it provided

"... for the destruction at one fell swoop of one or another of the most important pillars supporting the national military security structure of States." (ENDC/PV.140, pp.13,14)

The delegation of the Western Powers stressed the need for a gradual reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and also of the nuclear weapons themselves and other types of armaments. Otherwise, they pointed out, the existing balance of forces would be destroyed and that would allegedly entail a weakening of the security of the Western countries. What are we negotiating with you here? Is it disarmament or the maintenance of the existing balance of armaments? Everyone knows that we are conducting negotiations on disarmament, and that everything else should be subordinated to this purpose. The proposals submitted by States should be in keeping with this purpose and not with arguments for the maintenance of armed forces.

Having weighed up once again the views put forward by the Western representatives, the Soviet delegation has come to the conclusion that it cannot agree with their arguments and maintains its opinion that the speedy elimination of the threat of nuclear war through the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I and also as a result of the prohibition and elimination of nuclear

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weapons during stage I or II of general and complete disarmament has unquestionable advantages. In the first place, this approach to the solution of the problem will make it possible to reach a rapid decision on the main question, that of eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war. Secondly, if the means of delivery and the nuclear weapons themselves are destroyed one hundred per cent, the organization of control will be considerably facilitated. These advantages are so obvious that the Soviet proposals can be regarded as the most realistic, the most practical and the easiest to carry out.

With regard to the argument of the Western Powers that a rapid and radical solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the nuclear weapons themselves would entail an upsetting of the existing balance of forces, we are absolutely unable to agree with this conclusion of our Western colleagues. If all the nuclear Powers renounced nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, side-by-side with the gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, neither side would gain any advantage and both sides would be in the same conditions of security. The elimination of the threat of nuclear war in accordance with the Soviet disarmament programme would create a new international situation, would undoubtedly ensure greater security and would strengthen the cause of peace. Those are roughly the Soviet Union's proposals on the question of nuclear disarmament and a few considerations relating to the attitude of the Western Powers towards these Soviet proposals.

We consider that the more favourable international situation that has come about since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests will enable us to make progress in solving the problem of disarmament. We hope that now our Western partners will be in a position to weigh up and assess anew the Soviet proposals on nuclear disarmament and to consider them from a new angle, so as to try to find a mutually acceptable basis for agreement.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and fifty-first plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Italy and the Soviet Union.

"The United States delegation tabled an amendment^{1/} to the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, relating to nuclear disarmament in stage I. It also tabled the text^{2/} of draft articles VI to XII (relating to nuclear disarmament in stage I) of the United States Draft of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.

"The Canadian delegation submitted a Revised Outline Comparison of United States and Soviet Union disarmament proposals on general and complete disarmament^{3/}.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 16 August 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

^{1/} ENDC/30/Add.3

^{2/} ENDC/109

^{3/} ENDC/36/Rev.1

